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THE IMPACTS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Murray L. Weidenbaum
The process of regulation of business activity via governmental rules and
regulations generates a variety of impacts, direct and indirect, intended and
unintended, desirable and undesirable. Proponents of governmental intervention
stress the benefits that are expected to flow or the social problems to be
solved. The costs which are involved tend to be discounted or even ignored -11If we can put a man on the moon, why can't we clean up the Mississipp1? 11
The purpose of this report is to examine the various costs that are incurred
in the process of government regulation. 1 No judgments are expressed on .the
value of the many regulatory efforts.

By raising the public information level,

it is hoped that governmental decision making in this important area can become
a more balanced process, giving equal weight to the costs and other disadvantages
as well as the benefits and other advantages of proposed actions. The resul t ,
hopefully, will be the attainment of important national objectives with greater
effectiveness than characterizes the present situation.
Summary
The impacts of government regulation of business are being felt in every
part of the economy:
1. The taxpayer feels the effect. Government regulation literally has
become a major growth industry, an industry supported by the

taxp~er.

The

cost of operating federal regulatory agencies is rising more rapidly than the
budget as a whole, the population, or the gross national product (see Figure 1).
Mr. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at
Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. This report was prepared for the
Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Economic Growth and Stabilization,
U.S. Congress, April 1978, for their use in evaluating the impact of federal
rules and regulations on the American private sector. It was originally titled
The Cost of Government Regulation of Business."
11
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Outlays of 41 regulatory agencies are estimated to increase from $2.2 billion in
the fiscal year 1974 to $4.8 billion in fiscal 1979, a growth of 115 percent over
the five-year period.
2. The motorist feels the effect. Federally-mandated safety and environmental features increase the price of the average passenger car by $666 in 1978
(see Figure 2).

Compliance with those regulations costs American consumers $7

billion a year in the form of higher priced cars.

In addition, the added weight

of the cars is increasing fuel consumption perhaps by as much as $3 billion annually. Thus, the American motorist may be paying in the neighborhood of $10
billion a year to meet federal regulatory requirements in the two areas of
environment and safety.
3. The businessman feels the effect. There are over 4,400 different federal forms that the private sector must fill out each year. That takes over
143 million man hours, the economic equivalent of a small army. The Federal
Paperwork Commission estimated that the total cost of federal paperwork imposed
on private industry ranges from $25 billion to $32 billion a year and that 11 a
substantial portion of this cost is unnecessary." The smaller business is hit
disproportionately hard by paperwork, as well as other types of government regulation.
4. The homeowner feels the effect. Regulatory requirements imposed by
federal, state, and local governments are adding between $1500 and $2500 to the
cost of a typical new house. Using the midpoint of that range of cost estimates
(42,000) and applying it to the two million new homes built in 1977 results in
an added cost to the homeowner of $4 billion last year.
5. The consumer feels the effect. The costs of complying with government
regulations are inevitably passed on by business to the consumer in the form
of higher prices. The aggregate cost of complying with federal regulation
came to $62.9 billion in 1976, or over $300 for each man, woman and child in
the United States. The estimated $62.9 billion of costs imposed on

- 3FIGURE 1
GROWTH OF FEDERAL REGULATORY EXPENDITURES
AND OTHER ECONOMIC INDICATORS
1974 - 1977
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FIGURE 2
AUTOMOBILE PRICE INCREASES DUE 10
FEDERAL SAFETY AND EMISSIONS CONTROL REGULATION
(Retail Prices. P~r Auto)
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the private sector is twenty times the $3.1 billion spent to operate the ·
regulatory agencies in the same year (see ·Figure 3).

If we apply the same

multiplier of twenty to the amounts budgeted for regulatory activitf.es
for more recent years, we can come up with approximations of the private
sector•s cost of compliance and thus with the total dollar impact of government regulation. On that basis, it can be estimated that the costs arisfng
from government regulation of business (both the expenses of the regulatory
agencies themselves as well as the costs they induce in the private sector)
totalled $79.1 billion in the fiscal year 1977 and may reach $96.7 billion
in the current fiscal year. On the basis of the budget estimate for the
fiscal year 1979 the aggregate cost of government regulation may come to
$102.7 billion, cons·isting of $4.8 billion of direct expenses by the federal
regulatory agencies and $97.9 billion of costs of compliance on the part of
the private sector.

Although there is no assurance that larger budgets for

federal regulatory agencies generate a constant multiplier effect on the
private sector, the analysis in the body of this report tends to. show that
the data used here for private sector regulatory costs are substantially
underestimated.
6. The worker feels the effect.

Government regulation, albeit un-

intentionally, can have strongly adverse effects on employment. The

mini~um

wage law has priced hunareds of thousands of people out of labor markets.
One increase alone has been shown, on the basis of careful research, to ·
have reduced teenage employment by 225,000, with a disporportionately large
impact on non-white youngsters.

Many industry facilities and entire factories

have been closed down -- with substantial but unmeasurable effects on .
employment-- because of the high costs of meeting environmental, safety and
other regulatory requirements.

FIGURE 3
THE MULTIPLIER IN OPERATION:
The Total Cost of Federal Regulation in Fiscal Year 1979
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7.

The investor feels the effect.

Appl"oximately $10 billion .of

new private capital spending is devoted each year to

~eeting

governmenta11y

mandated environmental, safety, and similar regulations rather. than being
invested in profit-making projects.

Edward Denison of the Broo·kings

Institution has estimated that in recent years these deflections of private
investment from productive uses have resulted in a loss of approximately
one-fourth of the potential annual increase in productivity. Although
not directly calculable, the result is to exacerbate the already strong
inflationary pressures in the American economy.
8. The nation as a whole feels the effect of government regulation
in many ways.

The adverse consequences range from a slowdown in the

availability of new pharmaceutical products to the cancellation of numerous
small pension plans.

In total, the aggregate response to

th~

proliferation

of government regulation is a basic bureaucratization of American business.
These undramatic but fundamental effects occur because of the diversion of
management attention from traditional product development, production and
marketing efforts designed·to provide new and better products

a~d

services.

to meeting governmentally imposed social requirements.

The New Wave of Government Regulation ·
It is hard to overestimate the current rapid expansion of government
involvement in business in the United States. Certainly the majority of
public policy changes affecting business-government relations in

re~e~t

·years has been in the direction of greater governmental intervention -environmental controls, job safety inspections, equal employment opportun~ty

enforcement, consumer product safety regulations, energy restrictions,

- 7 ·-

and recording and reporting of items ranging from illnesses to fore.1gn .
currency

transact·ions~

Indeed, when we attempt to look

business-government relationship from the business

a~

the ·emerging

executiv~'s.v1ewpoint,

a very considerable public presence is evident in what

.ostens~bl~,,.o.r.- .. ·

at least historically, have been private affairs.
No one who operates a business today, neither the head .of a large
company nor the corner grocer, can do so without considering a
of governmental restrictions

a~~

regulations.

mult.itu~e

H1s or her costs and-profits

can be affected as much by a bill passed in Washington as by a management
decision ·fn the front office or a customer• s decision at the checkout
counter. Management decisions fundamentai to the business enterprise
are increas1ngly becoming subject to governmental influence, review, .
hat
or control, decisions such as: What lines of business to go int o? W
products can be produced? Which investments can be financed? Under what
conditions can products be produced? Where can they be made? . How can
they be marketed? What prices can be charged? What profit can.

~e made~

Virtually every major department of the typical indust rial corpo_rat1on
in the United States has one or more counterparts in a federal agency that
controls or strongly influences its internal decision making. The sc1en ....·
tists in corporate research laboratories now receive much of

~heir

guidance

from lawyers in federal, state, and local regulatory agencieso The .
engineers in manufacturing departments must abide by standards

promulga~ed

.

by Labor Department authorities. Marketing divisions must .follow_procedures
established by government administrators in product safety agencies. The
location of facilities must be in conformance with a variety of environmental statutes. The activities of personnel staffs are increasingly
restricted by the various executive agencies concerned with employment

- 8 -

conditions.

Finance departments often bear the brunt of the rising paper-.

work burden being imposed on business by government agencies who seem to
assume that information is a free good -- or in any event that more is
always better than less.
The newer types of governmental regulation of business are not
limited to the traditional regulatory agencies, such as the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Federal Communications Commission. Rather, the line operating departments and bureaus
of government -- the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health-EducationWelfare, Interior, Justice, Labor, Transportation, and Treasury

-~

are

now involved in actions that affect virtually every firm.
Impetus for this expa.nded government participation in economic
activity is being provided by a variety of consumer groups, environmental
organizations, civil right~ advocates, labor unions, and other ~itizens'
institutions.

In many cases, the increasing_regulation reflects public

and congressional concern that traditional federal and state-local programs
have not been effective. The new wave of regulation is also reinforced
by the belief that the private sector itself is responsible for many of
the problems facing society

~-

pollution, discrimination in emplojment,

unsafe products, unhealthy working environments, misleading financial
reporting, and so forth. The present trends 1n federal government regulation in the United States do not .represent an abrupt departure from an
idealized free rna rket econofl\Y, but rather the rapid i ntens i fi cat 1·on of
the long-term expansion of government influence over the private sector.
Government regulation at times can be justified as a logical response
to imperfections in the private economy or what economists call "faiJures 11
in the normal market system.

Examples.of such situations are pollution of

~

9 -

the environment, inadequate industrial safety practices, and long-tenm
health hazards.

Voluntary action to deal with such problems may place·

a f1nm under a competitive disadvantage. The specific company attempting
to correct the situation would tend to bear the full costs, while the
benefits of the improvement would be widely dispersed in the society.
"Free riders .. who do not make the expensive changes may nevertheless share
in the benefits (those "externalities" that economists write about) •.
An example of this situation is provided by the regulation of
pollution standards in the motor vehicle area. The basic justification
.for government setting standards for automobiles -- particularly in the
pollution area where so much of the benefit goes to society as a whole -was clearly stated by John J. Riccardo, president of Chrysler:
..... a large part of the public will not voluntarily
spend extra money to install en1ission control systems
which will help clean the air. Any manufacturer who
installs and charges for such equipment while his
competition doesn't soon finds he is losing sa.les and
customers. In cases like this, a government standard
requiring everyone to have such equipment is the only
way to protect both the public and the manufacturer."
The -current wave of government regulati·on is not merely an intensification of traditional activities.

In good measure, it is a new departure

and requires a new way of thinking.

The standard theory of government

regulation of business, which is still in general use and has dominated
professional and public thinking on the subject, is based on the model
of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Under this approach, a federal
commission 1s established to regulate a specific industry, with .the
related concern of promoting the well-being of that industry •. Often the
public or consumer interest is viewed as subordinate, or even ignored, as
the agency focuses on the needs and concerns of the industry that 1t 1s
regulating.

- 10 -

In some cases -- because of the unique eKpertise

por~sessed

b.v the

members· of the industry o·r its job enticements for regul utors who leave
..

government employment -- the regulatory corrmission may become a captive
of the industry which it is supposed to regulate. At least, this is a · ·
popularly held view of the development of the regulatory pro.cess·. Actual
practice of course varies by agency and jurisdiction and .over ti·me.

In

addition to the ICC, other examples of this development which have been
cited from time to time include the Civil

Aeronautic~

Board, the Federal

Co11111unications Conmission, the Federal Power Commission (now the· Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission),·and the Federal Maritime Commiss1on. 2
Although the traditional type of federal regulation of business surely
continues, the new regulatory efforts established by the Congress in recent
years follow, in the main, a fundamentally different pattern.

.

Evaluating

the activities of these newer regulatory efforts with the ICC type of model
is inappropriate and can lead to undesirable public policy. The new
federa·l regulatory agencies are simultaneously broader in the scope of
their jurisdiction than the ICC-CAB-·FCC model, yet in important aspects
are far more restricted.

This anomaly lies at the heart of the

proble~

of relating their efforts to national interests {see Figure 4) . .
In the cases of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Equal. Employment Opportunity Commission,
the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the
.
.. .

_,

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Federal Energy
Administration, the regulatory agency is not limited to a single industry.
For each of these relative newcomers. to the federal bureaucracy, its jurisdiction extends to the bulk of the private sector and at times to productive activities in the public sector itself.

It is this far-ranging

characteristic that makes it impractical for any single industry to

1

.

'

'

Figure 4
VARIATIONS IN FEDERAL REGULATION OF BUSINESS

'
Regulatory Agency

Category of Industry or Sector of the Economy
Rallroads
Radio
Manufacturing
and
and
Defense
Utilities Drugs Autos Products Other
Trucking Airlines TV
f

Consumer Product Safety
Co11111ission
Occupational Safety and
Health Administration
Equal Employment Opportunity
Co11111iss1on
Environmental Protection
Agency

"'
ICC

~~

\I

,..,

CAB

FCC

FERC

'

Consumer Groups

I

?>

Labor Unions

I

,.

Civil Rights
Groups

,

Ecologists

........

~

FDA

Interest
Group

~~

~

Traffic RenegeSafety tiation
Adm1 n- Board
1stration

--'
--'
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dominate these regulatory activities in the manner of .the traditional
mod.el. What specific industry is going to capture the EEOC or OSHA?
Or.would have the incentive to do so?
Yet, in comparison to the older agencies oriented to specific

indus~

tries, in many important ways the newer federal regulators operate 1-n a.
far narrower sphere. That is, they are not concerned with the totality
of a company or industry, but only with the limited segment of operations
which falls under their jurisdiction. The ICC, for example, must pay
attention to the basic mission of the trucking industry, to provide·
transportation services to the public, as part of its supervision of
rates and entry into the trucking business. The EPA•s interest in the
trucking industry, on the other hand, is almost exclusively in the effect
of trucking operations on the environment. This restriction prevents
the agency from developing too close a concern with the overall well-being
of any company or industry.

Rather, it can result i.n a total lack of

concern over the effects of its specific actions on a company or industry.
If there is any special interest that may come to dominate such a
functionally-oriented agency. it is the one that is preoccupied with its
specific task -- ecologists, unions, civil rights groups, and consumerists.
Thus, little if any attention may be given to the basic mission of the
industry to provide goods and services to the public. Also ignored are
crosscutting concerns or matters broader than the specific charter of the ·
regulating agency, such as productivity, economic growth, employment,
cost to· the consumer, effects on overall living standards, and inflat1onar,y
1mpacts. While the traditional regulatory agencies may be said to be
overly concerned at times with economic growth and productive efficiency.
the newer programs move to a different beat. Their impetus comes
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from such social considerations as improving the quality of life, both on
and off the job, and changing the distribution of income so as to
achieve greater equity among the various groups in the society.
To be sure, there are important cases which combine a blend of the
old and new forms of regulation. The Securities and Exchange Commission
is a good example.

In one aspect of its activities, it regulates a

specific branch of the economy, the securities industry.

Yet, many of

its rules also influence the way in which a great many companies prepare
their financial statements and reports to shareholders.

EconomY-wide

regulatory agencies are not a recent creation. The Federal Trade Commission
has existed for six decades.

Moreover, a few one-industry agencies

continue to be created, notably the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
which regulates the financial markets dealing with products of agriculture
and other extractive industries.
Varying alliances arise in promoting a given type of regulatory
activity -- or in pushing for reform. The business firms and labor
unions in a given regulated industry often become strong supporters of
the traditional industry-oriented commission which they have learned to
live with, 1f not to dominate. They may join ranks to oppose efforts by
consumer groups and economists to cut back on the extent of the "protective" regulation. This has been most apparent in the railroad and· trucking industries.
In contrast, consumer groups advocate expanding the newer types of
crosscutting or functional regulation.

In this effort, they often are

joined by labor groups, particularly in the occupational health area.
Here, reform efforts may be led by coalitions of business groups and
economists, who are concerned with the excessive costs and other consequences
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of the

spec1aliz~d

regulatory activities. These alliances may shift from

time to time. Specific safety regulations for automobiles may be opposed
by unions and companies in the motor vehicle industry -- although the two
groups may differ strongly on job safety standards. Labor, management,
and local governments may present a united opposition against specific
environmental effot'ts which are viewed as hurting the economies of their
coiTIIlunity, although some of these groups may advocate general ecological .
advances. The o1der consumer or·gani zati ons may become more concerned
with the ultimate cost to the consumer of expanding governmental act1.vit1es
than the newer and more militant groups that emphasize public control over
private sector activities.
Although the precise changes that will occur in the years ahead are
basically a matter for conjecture, the overall trend seems to be fairly
clear: on balance there is 1ikely to be more and not less gover·nment
intervention in internal business decision making.

Desp'ite differences

1n philosophy and outlook, changes both in control of the Executive Branch
and in the composition of the Congress and the Judiciary seem to have
little effect in altering that trend.
Government regulation, however, is a phenomenon still in the process
of development, rather than having attained a "steady state." The basic
factors causing the changes are diverse, ranging from the

con~e~n

by some

with the quality of life to the desire by others to increase the social
responsiveness of business enterprise. Yet, proposals for

chang~s

in

public policy affecting business are v1rtually all variations on a single
predictable theme: to increase the scope and degree of governmental
involvement while shifting costs from the federal treasury to the products
and services that consumers buy.

.. 1b -·

No ba 1anced eva·l uati on uf the avera 11 practice of government regul ~
tion comfortably fits the notion of benign and wise

offic1~1~·

making sensible decisions in the society's greater interests.

always

Numerous ·.

adverse side-effects and other costs are evident, as well as substantial
benefits to society.
Th~_l!~cts__Qf__§overn~ent

The

Regul ati or1

in1tia'J and dif'·ect effects of gover·nment regulation can be

measured by the budgets of the regulatory agencies themselves. These
governmental outlays indicate the costs of regulation which are borne
by the taxpayers.

Preliminary figures for the fiscal year 1979 show a

total of $4.8 bil"fion in federal expenditures to operate 41 agencies
which regulate business.. That dollar figure is more than double the
amount budgeted as recently as fiscal 1974. Clearly , the cost of operating
federa 1 regula tory agencies ·1 s rising more rapidly than the fede ra1
budget as a whole, the population of the country, the gross national
product.• or any other applicable basis for comparison.
As shown in Table 1, the bulk of the regulatory budgets is devoted
to the newer areas of social regulation, such as job safety, energy and
the environment, and consumer safety and health.

Examples of agencies

involved 1n this newer type of regulation are the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, and the Department of Energy. Unlike the
traditional regulating colllllissions which generally have jurisdiction
over individual industries, these agencies cover virtually a.ll companies.
including many sectors of economic activity which are not generally
thought of as being regulated

by

government.

Table 1 .

Area of Regulation

1974

1975

1976

Consumer Safety and
Health

$1,302

$1,463

$"1 ,613

Job Safety and Other
Working Conditions

310

379

Environment and
Energy

347

527

Financial Reporting,
and Other Financial
Industry-Specific
Regulation
Total

1977 .

1979

1974-79

$1 ,985

$2$582

$2,671

105%

445

492

562

626

102

682

870

989

1 '116

222
-J

~

36

45

53

58

70

69

92

245

269

270

309

340

341

39

$2,240

$2,683

$3,064

$3,714

,54 3

$4,823

115

Percent Distribution of Federal Regulatory
Fiscal Year 1979
Consumer Safety and Health
Job Safety and Other Working Conditions
Environment and Energy
Financial Reporting and Other Financial
Industry-Specific Regulation
Source: Center for the Study of American Business.

I

J

I

Increase

1978

--~4

£xpe~citures

56%
13

23
1
7

TOO

See Appendix for supporting detail.

i
I

I

I

~
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The figures displayed _in Table 1 reflect the fact that there has
been, and

continue~

activities.

to be, a steady yt"owth in the pace of \"'egulatory _

From a total of $2.2 billion in the fiscal year 1974, expen-

ditures on federal regulatory activities have risen in each.subsequent
year, with the largest. increases occurring in the fiscal years 1977 and.
1978. The costs to the taxpayer are obviously not trivial. but the key ·
effects of

gov~rnment

reyul a ti on· are in tenns of the comp 1i anee by the

private sector·.
Regulation and Inflation
Of the many ways in which government can affect the rate of i.nflat1on,
perhaps the-least understood method is to require actions in the private
sector which incredse the cost of production

an~

hence the prices of

products and services sold to the public. Attention-needs to be focused
on these regulatory policy instruments because their use is becoming more
widespread and neither the public nor government decision makers realize
their full inflationary effects.
In theory, the Federal Reserve System could offset the inflationary
effects of regulation by maintaining a lower rate of growth of the money
supply than 1t otherwise would.

In practice, however, public policy-

makers, insofar as they see the options clearly, tend to prefer the
higher rate of inflation to the additional monetary restraint and the
resulting decreases in employment and output. Also, to the extent that
regulation results in real resources being devoted to low-payoff activities, economic welfare is reduced.
At ·f irst blush, government imposition of socially desirable requirements on business through the regulatory process appears to be an inexpensive way of achieving national objectives. This practice apparently costs
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the government little and rep\"esents no significant direct burden on the
taxpayer.

But the public does not escape paying the cost.

Every time,

for example, the Environmental Protection Agency imposes a more costly
(albeit less polluting) method of production on any firm the cost of the ·
firm's product to the consumer \'Jill tend to rise.

Similar effects flow

from the ·other regulatory efforts, including those involving product
safety ·, job health, and hiring and promotion policies.
These higher prices, however, represent the "hidden tax" of regulation which is

shif~ed

from the taxpayer to the consumer. The

regulat~ry

"tax" would not be shifted in this manner if the mandated effort -- e.g.
environmental cleanup -- were conducted or at least financed by the
government itself. Moreover, to the extent that government-mandated
requirements impose similar costs on all price categories of a given
product (such as passenger automobiles), this hidden tax tends to be more
regressive than the federal income tax or state sales taxes. That 1s,
the costs may be a relatively higher burden on lower income groups than
on higher income groups.

It is

no~

inevitable that every regulatory

activity increase inflationary pressures.
tion generates

~ocial

In those instances where regula-

benefits (such as a healthier and thus more produc-

tive work force) in excess of the social costs it imposes, inflationary
pressures should be reduced.
At times the impact' of regulation on the prices th_at consumers pay
is direct and visible.

For example, in the case of the passenger auto-

mobile the federal government has required the producers to incorporate
a wide array of specified safety and environmental features.

The a·ureau

of Labor Statistics each year costs out the effect on the price of the
average car. Through 1978, the cumulative cost increase per vehicle of
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these mandated features can~ to $666, or $7.0 billion for all the vehicles
sold in that year. 3 (See Table 2).
Government regulation increases the .overhead cost of producing goo4s.
and services by imposing a rising burden of paperwork. As· of November 30, ·
exclu~fng

1976, there were 4,418 different types of approved federal fonms,
tax and banking fonns.

Individuals and business firms ,spend o.ver 143

million man-hours a year filling them out, according to the U.S. Office
of Management and Budget. As shown in Table 3, regulatory reports have
been the fastest growing portiun of the paperwork burden which the
federal government imposes on the private sector.
The paperwork and ancillary requirements of federal agencies inevitably.
produce a "regulatory 'lag, .. a delay that can run into years and can be a
costly drain on the time and budgets of private managers as

wel~ a~

public

officials. The Federal Trade Commission averages nearly five years to
complete a rtstra1nt-of-trade case.

It took the Federal Power Commission

11 years to determine how to regulate the price of natural gas all the ·
way back to the wellhead. The regulatory lag appears to be lengthening •.
Ten years a·go, the director of planning of the Irvine

Co~any

obtained

1n 90 days what was then called zoning for a typical residential development.

~n

1975, a decade later, the company .received what f.s now

call~d

entitlement to build for one of its developments, following two years of·
intensive work by a specialized group within the company's planning
department aided by the public affairs staff. The preparation of·env1ron-·
mental impact state111ents has become a major source of paperwork. Thereport for one off-shore oil field in the Santa Barbara Channel, for
· example, required nearly 1,300 pages and took two years to prepare. 4
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Table 2
Increase in Retail Price of Automobiles Due to Federal Regu1rements 1.
1968-78

Model
Year
1968

1968-69

Action

Initial
Retail
Price

Seat and shoulder belt
installations
H.E.W. Standards for exhaust emifosions systems

$ 11.51

Windshield defrosting
· and defogging systems
Windshield wiping and
washing systems
Door latches and hinge
systems
Lamps, reflective devices
and associated equipment

.70

Total
Adjusted for
Inflation a

$ 27.51

$ 47.84

6.30

8.80

14.53

16.65

16.65

27.48

9.50

.14.77

• 35

8.20

12.75

19.00

19.00

28.33

16.00

1. 25
.55

1969

Head restraints

1970

Lamps, reflective devices,
and associated equipment
Standards for exhaust emission systems

4.00

Theft protection (steering,
transmission and ignition locking and buzzing
system)
Occupant protection in interior impact (glove box
door remains closed on
impact)

7.85

1968-70

Year
Total

5.50

1971

Fuel evaporative systems

1972

Improved exhaust emissions
standards required by
Clean Air Act

6.00

Warranty changes resulting from federal requirement that all exhaust emissions systems
be warranted for 5
years or 50,000 miles

1.00
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Model
Year
1972
(cont.)

Action

----·
Voluntarily added safety
features in anticipation
of future safety requirements

Initial
Retail
Price

Year
Total

Total

Adjusted fir
Inflation

2.00

Seat belt warning ~ystem
and locking device on
retractors

~0.25

29.25

42.37

1972-73

Exterior protection (standard #215)

69.90

69.90

95.•29

1973

Location, identification,
and illumination of
controls improvements
Reduced fl an1nabi 1i ty of
interior materials

5.80

6.40

8.7~

15.30

15.30

20.85

109.00

133.50

129.90

146.66 .

. 1969-73
1974

1975

1975-76

1976

Improved side door
strength

.60

Interlock system and
other changes to meet
federal safety requirements
Improved exhaust emissions systems to comply
with the Federal Clean
Air Act

107.60

Additional safety features
associated with federal
motor vehicle safety
standards #105, #208,
and #216
Installation of catalytic
converter

10.70

Removal of interlock system
(quality decrease) and
add'l installation of
catalytic.converters
net effects {Oct.'76)
FM~ #105 hydraulic brake
system
FMVSS #215 improved bumpers
FMVSS #301 leak resistant
fuel system

1.40

119.20
18.00

6.50
4.80
2.10
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Model
Year

Action

1976

Improved emissionscontrol
system

(cont.)

. 1977

1978

Initial
Retail
Price
7.60

FMVSS #215 improved bumpers
1.30 ·
FMVSS #219 structural changes .95
FMVSS #301 leak resistant
4.70
fuel system
Improved .emissionscontrol
14.30
system
Redesign of emissionscontrol systems to meet
HEW air quality standards

9.99

index.

. Adjusted fir .
·.. Inflation
· -

39.00

'41. 54

21.25

'21 .2~

9,99

. .. 9.. 9~.
.·· : .

TOTAL
8 Yearly

Year
..Total

$519.65

$519.65

. $665.87 .

totals are expressed in 1977 dollars by use of the con$umer ·prfce

Source: Compiled from data supplied
Bureau of Labor Statistics.

·.,.

Total

by

the U.S. Department of Labor,

I

Table 3
Repetitive Public-Use Reports Approved for Use by Office of Management and Budget, December, 1966-June, 1973
·
Number of Fonns and Man-Hours Requ1red to Comrete. by Type of Fonn
(Man-Hours in millions.

As of Date

Administrative
Statistical
Regulation
ReQorts
Total
Reeorts
Re~orts
A~~lications
Number
Man-Hours
Number Man-Hours Number Man-Hours Number Man-Hours
Number Man-Hours

December, 1966

1,065

38.3

2,213

49.9

1,243

11.8

259

3.3

4,780

103.3

June, 1967

1 ,091

37.4

2,320

49.6

1,278

12.2

245

3.1

4,934

102.4

December, 1967

1,110

43.8

2,369

51.1

1,273

12.3

239

3.0

4,991

110.3

June, 1968

1,107

45.6

2,448

51.7

1,278

12.2

247

3.1

5,080

112.6

December, 1968

1,123

41.3

2,480

52.0

1,267

14.0

249

2.8

5,119

110.1

June, 1969

1,145

41.5

2,520

52.5

1,265

14.2

246

3.2

5,176

111.4

December. 1969

1,138

41.0

2,544

52.1

1,268

14.2

252

3.3

5,202

~10.6

June, 1971

1 t 187

44.6

2,705

57.1

1,339

14.7

268

6.0

5,499

122.5

December, 1971

1,152

46.8

2,570

57.5

1,318

11.4

258 -

14.8

- 5,298

130.5

June, 1972

1,207

41.6

2,613

66.0

1,314

13.3

271

15.1

5,405

136.0

December. 1972

1,258

41.0

2,623

75.4

1,332

16.1

328

8.0

5,541

140.4

June, 1973

1.308

48.4

2.616

72.0

1,306

16.1

337

8.7

5,567

145.3

Percent change

22.81

26.4%

18.2%

44.3S

5.11

36.4S

30.11

63.6S

16.51

40~7s

Source: - u.S~ Senate, C00111ittee on Government Operations, Improving the Coordination of Federal ~~rt1ng
Services. Hearings on 5.200 and 5.1812, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1973.

I
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Other aspects of government reyulatory activities also can be

~ostly.

Severa 1 research efforts exami n1 ng bu11 ding regulations have documented ·
repeated instances of incl·eases in the price of housing as a· r~sult. or·
local building codes.

.

Rutgers University reported ·that overly stringent

or outdated codes increase housing costs by somewhere between 5 and 1.0
percent of total unit costs. 5
A study in Colorado found that changing regulatory requirements and
practices had added $1,500- $2,000 to the cost of the typical new house
built between 1970 and 1975. The added cost consisted of higher water
and sewer tap fees, increased permit fees, greater school and park land
dedication requirements, and new mandates for wider and thicker streets.
fences. underground stonm sewersp and environmental impact studies.
In St. Louis County, Missouri, the increase in lot development and
homebuilding costs due to meeting _government requirenEnts during 19701975 came to $1,600- $2,500 for a typical 1600

squ~re

foo.t

ho~se

on a

10,000 square foot lot. The new governmentally-imposed requirements .
included street lighting, greater collector street widths, higher penm1t
and inspection fees, added features to electrical systems. and smoke
detectors.
A study covering 21 residential development projects i-n the New Jersey
Coastal Zone estimated the direct regulatory expenses for a

s1~gle

family

house at $1,600 during the period 1972-75. The costs covered some 38
separately required permits, including preliminary plat. perfonnance
improvement bond, sewer plan, tree removal permit, final plans review,
road drainage permit, and coastal area facilities perm1t. 6
Government inspectors are increasingly

frequ~nt,

albeit

unwelc~med,

visitors to business premises. Milk plants also experience an
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extraordinary variety of inspections. More than 20,000 state, county,
local, and municipal milk jurisdictions exist in the U.S. A USDA study
reveals. that milk plants are inspected about 24 times annually, even .
..

though the Public Health Service recolllllends only two a year. · In ·one
state, each milk plant averaged ninety-five inspections during a year.
One milk plant, licensed by 250 local governments, three states and twenty
other agencies reported that i.t was inspected 47 times in one month in
1964.
In the more traditional areas, many regulations deal with natural
monopolies, such as in the case of utilities.

In some of these one-industry

regulatory efforts, however, the government actions may be anti-competitive
and thus uJtimately costly to the consumer.

Interstate trucking furnishes

a cogent example, where federal regulation is in large degree a barrier .
~o

entry protecting existing firms against possible new entrants.
A recent report prepared at the Center for the Study of American ·

Business at

Washingto~

University estimates that the aggregate cost of

complying with federal regulation came to $62.8 billion in 1976 or

twe~ty·

times the direct cost to the taxpayer of supporting the major··regulatory
agencies 7 (see Table 4).
The basic approach followed in the study was to cull from the available literature the more reliable. estimates of the costs of specific
regulatory programs, to put those estimates on a consistent and reliable
basis, and to aggregate the results for 1976. Where a range of costs
was available for a given regulatory program, the lower end of the range
was generally used.

In many other cases no cost estimates were available.

Thus, the.numbers in the studY are low and underestimate the actual costs
of federal regulation in the United States.

/
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Table 4
Annual Cost of Federal Regulation,
By Area, 1976
(millions of dollars)
Administrative Compliance
Cost
Cost

Area

Total

1 ,516

5,094

6,610

Job Safety and Working Conditions

483

4,015

4,498

Energy and the Environment

612

7,760

8,372

Financial Regulation

104

1,118

1;222

Industry Specific

474

26,322

26,796

Paperwork

(a)

18,000

18,000

3,189

62,309

65,498

Consumer Safety and Health

Total

(a) Included in other categories
Source: Center for the Study of American Business
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Annual Cost of Federal Regulation,
By Area, Calendar 1976
(millions of dollars)
Admi ni strati ve
Cost

Compliance
Cost

Total

1,516

5,094

6,610

Job Safety and Working Conditions

483

4,015

4,498

Energy and the Environment

612

7,760

8,372

Financial Regulation

104

1 '118

1,222

Industry Specific

484

19,919

20,403

Paperwork

(a)

25,000

25,000

3,199

62,906

66,105

Area
Consumer Safety and Health

Total
(a) Included in other categories
Source:

Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University.
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The estimates of r·egulatorjf costs include cost5 incurred by the
federal government and costs incurred
regulation.

by

economic units in response to

In the first category, administrative costs are the expendi-

tures arising from the operation of a regulatory activity by the federal
government. These include salaries of government workers, office supplies,
etc. They are the outlays for regulator·y purposes which are reported in
the federal budget.

The second category, compliance costs, are those

costs incurred mainly by the private sector (and also by state and local
governments) in the process of complying with the federal regulatory
mandates. These expenditures do not show up in the federal budget and
were estimated.
Regulation and Innovation
As William D. Carey of the American Association for the Advancement
of

Sci~nce

has stated, "Government may imagine that it is neutral toward

the rate and quality of technological risk-taking, but it is not .••
regulatory policies aimed at the public interest rarely consider impacts
on innovat1on ... 8 The adverse effect of regulation on innovation is likely
to be felt more strongly by smaller firms and thus have an anti-competitive
impact.

According to Dr. Mitchell Zavon, president of the American

Association of Poison Control Centers,
"We've got to the point in regulatory action where
it's become so costly and risky to bring out products that only the very largest firms can afford
to engage in these risky ventures. To bring out a
new pesticide you have to figure a cost of $7,000,000
and seven years of time ... g
One hidden cost of government regulation is a reduced rate of introduction of new products. The longer it takes for a new product to be
approved by a government agency -- or the more costly the approval process
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-- the less likely that the new ptoduct will be created . In any event,
innovation will be delayed.
Professor Sam Peltzman of the University of Chicago has estimated,
for example, that the 1962 amendments to the Food and Drug Act are delaying
the introduction of effective .drugs by about four years, as well as leading
to higher prices for pharmaceutical products. 10 As a result in large
part of the

mar~

stringent drug regulations, the United States was the

thirtieth country to approve the anti-asthma drug metaproterenol, the
th1 rty-second country to

app~'ove

the anti -cancer drug adri amyci n, the

fifty-first to approve the anti-tuberculosis drug rifampin, the sixty-fourth
to approve the anti-allergenic drug cromolyn, and the or1e hundred sixth
to approve the anti-bacter·ial drug co-tr1maxazole ..11
According to Thomas G. Moore of the Hoover Institution at Stanford
University, regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission delayed the
introduction of unit trains by at least five years and delayed full use
by the Southern Railroad of the "Big John" cars used to carrygra1n;; 12
Ann Friedlander has estimated the loss in the railroad industry due to
retarded innovation at between $12 million and $41 million a year. 13
Regulation and Capital Formation
Federal regulation also affects the prospects for economic growth
and productivity by levying a claim on a rising share of new capital
formation.

This effect of regulation is mast evident in the

and safety areas.

environment~l

According to the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality,

private capital outlays for pollution control in 1975 were $3.8 b1111on
higher than would have been the case in the absence of federal environmental
requirements. 14 Similarly, the McGraw-Hill Department of Economics estimates the cost to American industry of meeting the occupational health
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and safety r·egulations at about $3 billion a year.

Thus these t"'o programs

alone account for 6 percent of total capital spending in the private
sector of the American economY, which came to $113 billion in 1975.
Edward Denison of the Brookings Institution has estimated the loss
of pt·oduct 1vi ty experienced 1n the United States 1n recent years 1n
meeting government pollution and job safety standards. The loss in
productivity results both from diversion of capital investment as well
as· from current expenses in meeting these regulatory requirements.

By 1975, output per unit of input in the nonresidential business sector
of the economY was 1.4 percent smaller than it would have been if business
had operated under the regulatory conditions of 1967. Of this amount,
Denison ascribes 1.0 percent to pollution abatement and 0.4 percent to
emplpyee safety and health programs. 15
The reductions had been small in 1968 - 1970, but were rising rapidly
1n the 1970's. The increase in the amount of such lost productivity cut
the annual change in output per unit of input by 0.2 percent in 1973,
0.4 percent in 1974, and 0.5 percent in 1975. The recent reduction in
'

I

growth rates is equivalent to a large portion of the recent rises 1n
economic growth. 16
Capital formation and productivity may also be advers.ely affected
by the uncertainty about

~he

future of regulations governing .the 1-ntro.duction

of new processes and products.

An example is furnished in the report

of a task force of the U.S. Energy Resources Council dealing with the
possibility of developing a new synthetic fuel industry.

In

evaluatin~

the impact of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
the task force reported, "It would be next to impossible at this time

~o
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predict the impact of these requil~ements on synthetic fuels productfon ... 17
ln cons1dering the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 1 .the task
force stated that the major uncertainty was not whether a project· wo~~~
be allowed to ·proceed, but rather the length of time tha·t. it. would be
delayed pending the issuance of an environmental impact.statement that
would stand up in court.

In assessing the overall impact of government

regulatory activity on the establishment of a new energy industry, the
task force concluded,

11

ln summary, some of these requirements could easily

hold up or permanently postpone any attempt to build and operate a synthetic fuels plant ... 18
Regulation and Employment
Government regulation, albeit unintentionally, can have strongly
adverse effects on employment. The minimum wage law, for example, has
priced many teenagers out of labor markets.

One recent study has shown

that the 1966 increase in the statutory minimum wage reduced teenage
employment in the United. States

by

225,000 below what it. otherwise would

have been in 1972. Thus, as a result of that one change in government
regulation, the youth unemployment rate in 1972 was 3.8 percentage points
higher than it would otherwise have been" 19
In construction labor -- where unemployment rates are substantially
above the national average -- government regulation also acts to price
some segments of the work force out of competitive labor markets. Under
the Davis-Bacon legislation, the Secretary of Labor promulgates 11 preva111ng 11
wages to be paid on federal and federally-supported construction·projects.
A variety of studies has shown that these federally mandated wage rates
are often above those that actually prevail in the labor market where
the work is to be done. 20
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Regulation and Small Business
Government regulation!) often unwittingly, tends. to hit small business _.
d1sp~oportionately hard. 21 Most of this impact is un~ntent1~na1, in that
the regulations typically do not distinguish ·among companies of different
sizes.

But in practice, forcing a very small finn. to fill out the s·ame

specialized forms as a large company with highly ... trai_ned technica.f staffs
at its disposal places a significantly greater burden on that

small~r.

enterprise. This general point is supported by data and examples for
such different governmental regulatory activities as the Environmenta.l
Protection Agency, the Employee Retirement Income Security Actp .National
Labor Relations Board, Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
A current example of governrrent regulation affecting small business
disproportionately is the proposed standards for air-lead exposure levels
promulgated by the Occupational Safety and.Health Administration. The
impact of these standards has been examined in a recent study by Charles
River Associates.

In the battery industry, which is made up of 143 f1 rms j)

OSHA lead regulations are estimated to result in much larger per unit
production costs for smaller plants than for larger plants. Because of
large differential costs and the fact that battery prices would only rise .
to cover the unit costs of the larger firms, smaller plant operators
would be forced to absorb the differential in costs.

In many cases the

amount absorbed would eliminate entirely the plant's profitability.
According to the Charles River Associates study, about 113 single plant
battery firms would be forced to close, eliminating half of the productive
capacity not operated by the five major battery companies.
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It is much more difficult

t:o

assess the impact of regulations ..that

are merely burdensome to small business, such as filling out government
fonms and responding to information requests by regulatory agencies.
The Commission on Federal Paperwork reports that S,OOOPOOO small businesses
spend $15 - 20 billion, or an average of over $3,000 each on federal
paperwork.

Not all examples of the heavier burden of regulation on small

business have to do with the newer regulatory agencies. A National Labor
Relations Board election is a good example. Table 5 shows the total
estimated cost per employee of an NLRB election by size of the company
work force.

Clearly the unit cost of meeting thfs·regulatory requirement

is smaller for the large firm ($101.60 for companies with over 1,000
employees) and larger for the small firm ($134.60 for firms with fewer
than 100 workers). 2 ~
Table 5
NLRB Election Costs
Cost Categorl
Legal

·~er Em~lolee

Number of Employees Eligible to Vote
50- 99 100-149 150-299 300-599 600-11000 1,000+
$ 26.00 $ 19.00 $ 15.50 $ 12.00 $ 8.00

$ 8.00

Employee Time

27.00

27.00

27.00

27.00

27.00

27o00

Loss fn
Productivity

57.60

57.60

57.60

57.60

57 . 60

57.60

Executive Time

24.00

20.00

18.00

12.00

9.60

9.00

Total Cost
per Employee

~
•.::

$134.60 $123.60 $118.10 $108.60 $102.20

Source: Michigan State University Business Topics

$101.60
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Regulation and

Entre~reneuri.al

Functions

One of the unmeasurable effects of government regulation 1s what
1t does to the basic entrepreneurial nature of the private enterprise
system.

To the extent that management's attention is diverted from

traditional product development, production, and marketing concerns to
meeting governmentally imposed social requirements, a significant bureauc.rat1zat1on of corporate activity results.
In employee pension fund

manag~ment,

for example, the recently

enacted pension regulation has shifted much of the concern of fund managers from.maximizing the return on the contributions to a more cautious
approach of minimizing the likelihood that the managers will be criticized
for their investment decisions.

It thus becomes safer -- although not

necessarily more desirable for the employees covered -- for the pension
I'

managers to keep mote detailed records of their deliberat ions, to h1re
more outside experts {so that the responsibility can be diluted), and to
avoid innovative 1nvestments. 23
In the occupational safety and health area, professional safety staffs
are often diverted from their bdsic function of training workers 1n.safer
operating procedures to filling out fonns, posting notices,· and meeting
other essentially bureaucratic requirements.

OSHA directives, for example,

contain very specific requirements for virtually every piece of equipment
used in the production of steel. These requirements range from such major
items as coke ovens all the way down to such minutiae as the ladders used
in plants and the mandatory 42-inch height from the floor for portable
fire extinguishers.
The results measured by any improvement in safety are almost invariably
disappointing.

Two major studies of the occupational safety and health
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(OSHA) progr·am to date have yielded negative findings.
concluded that "The OSHA Act has failed thus far to live

Nicholas A. Ashford
~P

to its poten-

tial for reducing job injury and disease •.• OSHA has had little measurable
impact in reducing injuries and deaths." 24
In a more detailed statistical ana·lysis, RobertS. Smith reported
similar findings, ..... the estimated effects Lof OSHA7 on injuries are so
small that they cannot be distinguished from zero ... 25 Apparently, the
original concern of the public and the Congress to reduce accidents has
been converted to obeying rules and regulations. The disappointing results
lead to a predictable reaction;

redouble the existing effort -- more rules.

more fonns, more inspection, and thus higher costs to the taxpayer and
higher prices to the consumer.
More recent statistics on occupational injuries and illnesses are
hardly reassuring.

The reported overall accident and illness rate have

been declining, from 10.4 per 100 workers in 1974 to 9.1 in 1975. However,
the number of workdays lost to injuries and illnesses per 100 workers
actually rose, to 54.4 in 1975 from 53.1 in 1974. On the average the
affected workers took more time off than in the previous year. This could
indicate that the injuries and illnesses that did occur in 1975 were
typically more severe. Apparently the impact of OSHA occurred primarily
in reducing the number of minor accidents and illnesses.
Approaches to Regulatory Reform
A new way of looking at the microeconomic effects of regulatory
programs may be helpful to public policymaking. A parallel can be drawn
to macroeconomic matters, where important and at times conflicting objectives are recognized and attempts at reconciliation or trade-off are made
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(for example, as among economic growth, employment, income distribution,
and pr1ce.stabil1ty). At the microeconomic level, it may likewise be
appropriate to reconcile the goals of specific government programs with
national objectives.
Healthy working conditions, for example, are an important national
objective, but not the only important national objective. Society
supposedly should avoid selecting the most costly and disruptive methods
of achieving a higher degree of job safety. Similarly, environmental
protection, product safety, and other regulatory efforts should be
related to costs to the consumer, availability of new products, and the
employment of the work force.

In part, this reconciliation can be made

at the initial stages of the governmental process. when the President
proposes and the Congress enacts a new regulatory program.
Benefit/Cost Analysis
One device for broadening the horizons of government policymakers
and administrators is the economic impact statement.

Policymakers could

be required to consider the costs (and other adverse effects) of their
actions as well as the benefits.
This is not a novel idea.

In November 1974, then President Gerald

Ford instructed the federal agencies under h·is jurisdiction to examine
the effects of the major regulatory actions on· costs, productivity,
employment, and other economic factors. This first step was subject to
several shortcomings. Many of the key regulatory agencies -- ranging
from the Consumer Product Safety Commission to the Federal Trade Commission
-- are so-called "independent agencies," which· are beyond the· President's
jurisdiction.
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Second, even in the case of the regulatory activities that come
within presidential jurisdiction, the existing policy is limited to the
regulations that, in the issuing agency•s own estimation, are "major. 11
Third, the agencies covered by the Executive Order are only required to
examine the economic aspects ·of their actions; the weight they give to
economic factors remains in their discretion -- to the extent that
Congressional statutes permit them to give any consideration to economic
influences at all.
Within these constraints, the Council on Wage and Price Stability
has intervened in many cases of proposed regulation to offer its analyses
of the benefits and the costs of the proposed action. The agencies have
rarely welcomed this advice, but the publicity given some of. the Council's
analyses may have at times provided a deterrent to the more traditionallyminded personnel of regulatory agencies, as well as serving a larger
public educational purpose.
A broader approach may be warranted, one with a strong legislative
mandate.

In the fashion of the environmental impact statements (but

hopefully without as much of the trivia), Congress could require each
regulatory agency to assess the impact of its proposed actions on the
society as a whole, and particularly on the economY. Much_ would depend
on the 11 teeth" put into any required economic imp.act

statemen~.

legislating the performance of some economic analysis by an

Merely

unsym~athet1c

regulator would serve little purpose beyond delaying the regulatory

proces~

·and making it more costly. But limiting. government regulation to those
instances where the total benefits to society exceed the costs would be .
a major departure from current practice.
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To an eclectic economist, government regulation should be carried
to the point where the incremental costs equal the incremental benefits,
and no further.

Indeed, this is the basic criterion that is generally

used to screen government investments in physical resources. Overregulation -- which can be defined as regulation for which the costs exceed
the benefits -- would be avoided under this approach.
Many of the proposa·ls to reform government regulation involve the
"sunset" mechanism -- the compulsory periodic review of each major
regulatory program to determine whether it is worthwhile to cQntinue
1t.
1n the light of changing circumstances. A benefit/cost analysis would
provide a quantitative mechanism to aid in making those value judgments.
Budgeting as a Management Tool
Attention should be given to the role of the budget process in managing regulation.

In those cases where an agency's regulations generate

more costs than benefits, the agency's budget for the 90ming year might
be reduced.

Budget reviewers, be they examiners in the· executive branch

or committee staffs in the legislature, face the perennial question of
how to measure the effectiveness of an agency that does. not pro vi de market.. able outputs. The traditional response is to concentrate on the inputs
ut111zed (as, for example, workload statistics}.
cost/effectiven~ss

Benefit/cost analysis,

analysis (which is in effect the search

fo~

least-cost

solutions) or other quantitative forms of program evaluation may provide
useful alternatives in such cases.
Because the requested appropriations for the regulatory .agencies are
relatively small portions of the government's budget, limited
has been given to these activities in the bu.dget process.

~ttent1~n

.·

In view of the

large costs that they often impose on the society as a whole (those "hidden ·
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taxes 11 shifted to the private sector),

gr~,;ater

attention than now given

is warranted to the •·eviews of thft appropriation requests for regulatory
programs.
The wide dissemination of data on the economic impacts of ·government
regula.tion also may serve to alter the balanr.e of forces now exerted
interest groups on the decision making process.

by~

At present, interest

grou1>s are most often we 11 awa r·e of the benefits they would rece1 ve from
a proposed regulation, and thus the.; mobi 1i ze the1 r forces to promote
that regulation.

But 1nfonnation on the adverse consequences of the

regulation, if widely distributedt might
from other groups. 26

gene,~ate

countervailing pressures

Changing Attitudes Toward Re[ulatipfl
Basically, however, it is attitudes that may need to be changed.
Experience with the job safety program provides a cogent example. Although
the government's safety rules have resulted in billions of dollars 1n
public and private outlays, the basic goal of a safer work environment
h~s

not been achieved.
A more satisfying answer to improving the effectiveness of government

regulation of private activities requires a basic change

1~

the approach

to regulation, and one not limited to the job safety program.
that program is used here merely as an

illustration~

Indeed,

If the objective of

public policy is to reduce accidents, then public policy should focus
directly on the reduction of accidentso

Excessively detailed regulatfons

are often merely a substitute -- the normal bureaucratic substitute -for hard policy decisions.
Rather than emphasis being placed on issuing citations to emp.loyers
who fa11 to fill fonns out correctly or who do not post tne required notices,
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it should be placed on the regulation of those employe.rs with high and
rising accident rates.

Perhaps fines should be levied on those

es~abltsh~

ments with the worst safety records. As the accident rates decline ·.
toward some sensible average standard, the fines could be reduced or :·.
eliminated.
But the government should not be much concerned with the way· a ·
specific organization achieves a safer working environment. Some

~ompan1es

may find it more efficient to change work rules, others to buy new equ1_pment, and still others to retrain workers. The making of this choice 1s
precisely the kind of operational business decision making that government should avoid, but that now dominates many regulatory programs.Without diminishing the responsibility of the employers, the sanctions
under the federal occupational safety and health law should be extended
to employees, especially those whose negligence endangers other employees.
The purpose here is not to be harsh, but to set up effective incentives
to achieve society•s objectives. This can be a preferred alternative to
government specifying the details of what it considers to be 11 acceptable 11
private

~ction.

A recent case in point is provided by the proposed job safety ·
standards for exposure to lead in the workplace. OSHA would

re~uire

smelters, battery manufacturers and other firms to install engineering
controls that reduce the maximum exposure level from its present 200
micrograms of lead per cubic meter of air to 100 micrograms.
The_U.S. Council on Wage and Price Stability has estimated·that·
meeting the proposed standards could cost the industries affected and
ultimately consumers over $300 million a year. The Council urges that
OSHA allow each company to use the most efficient way of achieving the
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new standard, whether that requi _..es costly engineering controls or some
other method. 27 Intensive employee training might be one of those
alternate methods, if a study in the United Kingdom can serve as a guide.
According to a report in the British Journal of Industrial Medicine, the
lead exposures of employees doing almost identical jobs differed by ratios
of up to four to one. This was tota 'lly attributed to persona 1 differences
1n working hab1ts. 28
With reference to consumer protection regulation, an infonnation
strategy may often provide a sensible alternative.

For the many visible

hazards that consumers voluntarily subject themselves to, perhaps the
most important consideration of public policy is to .improve the individual's
knowledge of the risks involved r·ather than limit personal discretion.
In their daily lives, citizens rarely opt for zero risk alternatives.
For example, many pedestrians voluntarily race across a busy intersect ion
rather than wait for the traffic light to change.
Alternatives to Regulation
The promulgation bY government of rules and regulations restricting
or prescribing private activity of course is not the only means of accomplishing public objectives.

Codes of behavior adhered to on a voluntary
basis may often be effective. 29 Trade associations on occasion have
served such a socially useful function in upgrading the level of.bus1ness
performance.
Government itself has available to it various powers other

tha~

the

regulatory mechanism. Through its taxing authority, the government can
provide strong signals to the market.

Rather than promulgating detailed

regulations governing allowable discharges into the nation's waterways,
the government could levy substantial taxes on those discharges. Such
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sumptuary taxation could be "progressive," to the extent that the tax
rates would rise faster than the amount of pollution emitted by an
individual polluter. Thus, there would be an incentive for finms to
concentrate on remov;ng or at least reducing the more serious instances
of pollution.
The use of taxation would neither be meant to punish polluters nor
to give them a "license'' to pollute.

Rather it would be using the price

system to encourage producers and consumers to shift to less polluting .
ways of producing and consuming goods and services.

The cost of removal

of pollution for each organization, compared to the size of the tax,
would determine the level of environmental cleanup that it pursues. Those
that can control pollution more cheaply wi11 clean up more (and thus pay
less tax).

Those with higher control costs will clean up less (and pay

more pollution taxes).

This approach attempts to achieve a given level

of environmental quality with minimum resource use by equalizing the
marginal cost of pollution contro1. 30
In the case of the traditional one-industry type of government regulation (as of airlines, trucking, and railroads) a greater role should be
given to the competitive process and to market forces.

Unlike the newer

forms of regulation on which this paper concentrates, the older forms of
regulation are often mainly barriers to entry into a given industry, protecting existing fi·rms from competition by potential new entrants.

It 1s

in this limited sense that deregulation is a viable option. The elimination of regulation in the safety, ecology, and related areas does not
appear to be a realistic alternative in view of the nation•s long-tenm
social concerns.
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Indeed, any realistic appraisal of government regulation must
~cknow1edge

that important and positive benefits have resulted from

many of these activities -- less pollution, fewer product hazards, ·
reducing job discrimination, and other socially desirable goals of our ·
society. But the "externalities" generated by federal regulation cannot ·
justify government attempting to regulate every facet of private behavior.
As Henry Owen and Charles Schultze have pointed out, a reasonable approach
to this problem requires great discrimination 1n sorting out the hazards
that 1t 1s important to regulate from the kinds of lesser hazards that
can best be dealt with by "the normal prudence of consumers, workers,
and bus 1ness fi nns ... Jl
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Appendix: Federal Expenditures for Regulation of Business

\

\

\
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Appendix Table 1
and Health
Agency
De~artment

1974

19'75

1976

1977

1978

1979

314

345

377

337

220

219

9

. 23

23

138

619

588

of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service
Federal Grain Inspection
Service
Food Safety and Quality
Service

314

345

377

484

862

830

165

201

218

245

283

298

1

2

*

2

1

*

Antitrust Division

14

18

21

26

35

45

Drug Enforcement Admin1stration**

98

132

146

167

190

194

112

150

167

193

225

. 239

National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration

157

150

151

169

206

246

Federal Railroad Admin1strati on a

7

9

15

17

21

2-i

Subtotal
De~artment of Health, Educatton 1 and Qe11are

Food and Drug Admin1stration
De~artment of Housing and
Or an Deve1oEment

Interstate Land Sales and
Other Regulatory Functions
De~artment

of Justice

Subtotal
Deeartment of

Trans~ortation
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Appendix Table 1 ( cCJn t ·l ~·ued)

-

Agene.)!

1974

Coast Guard

210

-1975 -1976 -1977 -1978 -1979
162
261
281
294
192
1

*

1

1

...

6

7

7

8

13

376

328

365

455

517

578

79

95

103

117

127

134

Customs Service

228

299

334

436

510

534·

Subtotal .

307

394

437

553

637

668

Consumer Product Safetx
Co11111isston

19

34

38

40

42

40

National Trans~ortat1on
Safety Board

8

9

11

13

15

15

Federal Aviation Adm1n1strati on

2

Federal Hfghw~ Adm1n1strati on
Subtotal
De~artment

of the

Treasur~

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and F1 reanns

3b

Consumer Protection Act1v1t1es
Total

1,302

1,463

1,613

1,985

2,582

2,671
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Appendix Table 2
Exf!elld1tures on Federal Regulatur~ Activftfes.
Jo6 Sarett ana Ot~er AorE~ng onafttons
(Fiscal Years, Millions of Dollars)
Agency

1974

De~artment

of the

1975

1976

1977

1m

ill!

16

. 1

Inte\~ior

Office of Surface Mining,.
Reclamation and Enforcementc
M1 ni ng Enforcement atad
Safety Administration

59

68

-84

..1!

..!!

-d

59

68

84

98

69

1

Employmegt Standards Administrati on

56

72

84

60

67 '

77

Labor-Management Services
Administration

24

27

37

47

55

58

Occupational Safety and
Health Administration

69

90

109

127

129

150

-d

_q

-d

_q

~

124

149

189

230

234

306

409

Egual Bm~lolment O~~ortuni~
~ornniss~on

42

56

59

72

88

108

National Labor Re·t at ions
UOard

55

61

67

81

92

100

-5

- s·

_.§.

_J_

_J_

_!

446

. 492

·562

626

Subtotal
Department of Labor

Mine Safety and Health
Administration
Subtotal

Occu~ational Safet~

Realtn

and

~eview ~omm1sslon

Total

310

379

~·

47 -

Appendix Table 3

Agency
Department of Ener~f

-1974 -1975

1976

lll:

1978

-1979 .

33

121

136

199

238

Council on Environmental
Quality

2

3

3

4

3

3

Environmental Protection
Agency

232

317

363

436

473

522

80

-86

-180

231

ill..

307 .

682

870

989

Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Total

347

527

284

1 '116

Appendix Table 4
Expenditures on Federal Regulatorf Actfv1tfes, Financial Reporting,
and Otner 1nanc~a1 .
(Fiscal Years. Millions of Dollars)
Agency
Cost Accounting Standards
Board

1974

1975

. 1976

illl

ill!

1m.

1

1

1

2

2

2

*

1

2

2

2

-35

-44

..ll

.!i

66

36

45

53

58

-6965

Council on Wage and Price
Stab111ty
Securities and Exchange
Com1ss1on
Total

-

70
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Appendix Table 5

Agency

1974

C1vf1 Aeronautics Board
Commod1tl Futures Trading
Conwn1ssfon
Federal Communications
Conm1ss1on

89

39

-1975 -1976
81
39

llli.

1979
·
-1978 96 .

10l

91

103

11

14

15

16

38

48

53

56

70

66

6

7

8

8

10

10

Federal Power Conmiss1on

27

34

h

h

h

h

Federal Trade Commission

32

39

44

52

62

64

International Trade Contn1ss1on

7

8

10

11

12

13

Interstate Commerce Commission

38

44

47

59

64

69

-5

-5

_!

_!

_]_

245

269

-2706

309

340

341

Federal Maritime Commission

Renegotiation Board
Total
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Notes:

* Less than $1 mf111on
** Actfv1t1es extend beyond business regulation (breakdown not available).
(a) Railroad Safety only.
(b)

Costs of proposed Consumer Representation less saving from consolidating
Consumer Protection Activities.

(c) Regulation and Technology only.

(d) During FY 1978, MESA functions were transferred to

th~

Mine Safety

and Health Administration under the Department of Labor.
'

'

(e) Costs for improving and protecting wages and

'

e11m1natfo~

of discrimination

fn employment only.
(f)

Energy information, policy, and regulation.

(g)

Expenditures for Commodity Exchange Authority.

(h)

Federal Power Commission functions have been transferred to the
Department of Energy.

Source: Computed from details 1n the Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 1979. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1978.
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